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crisis responses during the 1960s and 1970s when U.S. The substance of the July 1962 discussion is one of the revelations in today’s publication, the second of a two-part collection documenting U.S. strategic forces to DEFCON 2, the highest level of force readiness short of a decision to go to war.

Just weeks after this discussion, Moscow and Washington found themselves on the verge of a dangerous confrontation over missile deployments in Cuba that brought U.S. The Allies would be on “very unpredictable ground when we have gone this far.” Suggesting that early nuclear use could amount to a last move, Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze demurred, pointing to the terrible risks: the “dangers of preemption will multiply” once “nuclear bargaining” had begun. Washington, D.C., Ap– The United States and its European allies disagreed over the advisability of using nuclear weapons to signal resolve and deter war if a serious crisis with Moscow over West Berlin broke out, according to a review of declassified records posted today by the nongovernmental National Security Archive.ĭuring a July 1962 Allied discussion of contingency planning, published today for the first time, a French diplomat argued that nuclear demonstration shots would send a message to the Soviets without triggering “all-out war.” Doing so “would bring to bear in Moscow the idea that their next move may be their last.” A West German official took a similar position. FOIA Advisory Committee Oversight Reports.